INHALT

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/909 of 30 June 2020 imposing a definitive anti-dumtaping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia and the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/909
of 30 June 2020
imposing a definitive anti-dumtaping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia and the People’s Republic of China, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036
1.
PROCEDURE
1.1.
Measures in force
1.2.
Request for an expiry review
1.3.
Initiation
1.4.
Review investigation period and period considered
1.5.
Interested parties
1.5.1.
Sampling
1.5.2.
Sampling of Union producers
1.5.3.
Sampling of importers
1.5.4.
Sampling of producers in the PRC and Russia
1.6.
Replies to the questionnaire
1.7.
Verification
1.8.
Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation for the imports of ferro-silicon originating in the PRC
2.
PRODUCT UNDER REVIEW AND LIKE PRODUCT
2.1.
Product under review
2.2.
Like product
3.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING
3.1.
Preliminary remarks
3.1.1.
PRC
3.1.2.
Russia
3.2.
Continuation of dumping of imports during the review investigation period
3.2.1.
PRC
3.2.1.1.
Normal value
(a) Existence of significant distortions
(i)
Significant distortions affecting the domestic prices and costs in the PRC: general economic context
(ii)
Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation: the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country
(iii)
Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation: State presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs
(iv)
Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation: public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces
(v)
Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation: the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws
(vi)
Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation: wage costs being distorted
(vii)
Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation: access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting independently of the State
(viii)
Systemic nature of the distortions described
(ix)
Conclusion
(b) Representative country
(i)
General remarks
(ii)
A level of economic development similar to the PRC
(iii)
Production of the product under review in the representative country
(iv)
Availability of the relevant public data in the representative country
(v)
Level of social and environmental protection
(vi)
Conclusion
(c) Sources used to establish undistorted costs
(d) Factors of production
(i)
Introduction
(ii)
Raw materials and by-products/waste
(iii)
Labour
(iv)
Electricity
(e) Manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A and profits
(f) Calculation of the normal value
3.2.1.2.
Export price
3.2.1.3.
Comparison and dumping margin
3.2.1.4.
Conclusion
3.2.2.
Russia
3.2.2.1.
Normal value
3.2.2.2.
Export price
3.2.2.3.
Comparison and dumping margin
3.2.2.4.
Conclusion
3.3.
Likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping should measures be repealed
3.3.1.
PRC
3.3.1.1.
Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC
3.3.1.2.
Availability of other markets
3.3.1.3.
Attractiveness of the Union market
3.3.1.4.
Conclusion on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping
3.3.2.
Russia
3.3.2.1.
Production capacity and spare capacity in Russia
3.3.2.2.
Availability of other markets
3.3.2.3.
Attractiveness of the Union market
3.3.3.
Conclusion on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping
3.4.
Overall conclusions on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping
4.
INJURY
4.1.
Definition of the Union industry and Union production
4.2.
Union consumption
4.3.
Imports from the countries concerned
4.3.1.
Cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports from the countries concerned
4.3.2.
Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned
4.3.3.
Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting
4.4.
Imports from third countries other than the PRC and Russia
4.5.
Economic situation of the Union industry
4.5.1.
General remarks
4.5.2.
Macroeconomic indicators
4.5.2.1.
Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
4.5.2.2.
Sales volume and market share
4.5.2.3.
Growth
4.5.2.4.
Employment and productivity
4.5.2.5.
Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping
4.5.3.
Microeconomic indicators
4.5.3.1.
Prices and factors affecting prices
4.5.3.2.
Labour costs
4.5.3.3.
Inventories
4.5.3.4.
Profitability, cash flow, investments, and return on investments and ability to raise capital
4.6.
Conclusion on the situation of the Union industry
5.
LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY
5.1.
Spare production/processing capacity
5.2.
Attractiveness of the Union market
5.3.
Impact of imports from the countries concerned on the situation of the Union industry should the measures be allowed to lapse
5.4.
Conclusion on likelihood of recurrence of material injury
6.
UNION INTEREST
6.1.
Interest of the Union industry
6.2.
Interest of users
6.3.
Interest of importers
6.4.
Conclusion on Union interest
7.
ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3