INHALT

2009/608/EC: Commission Decision of 24 April 2007 relating to the aid measure implemented by Belgium in support of Inter Ferry Boats (C 46/05 (ex NN 9/04 and ex N 55/05)) (notified under document C(2007) 1180) (Text with EEA relevance)

COMMISSION DECISION
of 24 April 2007
relating to the aid measure implemented by Belgium in support of Inter Ferry Boats (C 46/05 (ex NN 9/04 and ex N 55/05))
(notified under document C(2007) 1180)
(Only the Dutch and French texts are authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2009/608/EC)
1.
PROCEDURE
1.1.
Cases NN 9/04 and N 55/05
1.2.
Case C 46/05
2.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE RESCUE AND RESTRUCTURING MEASURES
2.1.
The parties to the framework agreement on the rescue and restructuring of IFB
2.1.1.
IFB
2.1.1.1.
Description of the company
2.1.1.2.
Markets concerned and IFB’s market shares
2.1.2.
SNCB
2.2.
The financial difficulties encountered by IFB in 2001 and 2002
2.2.1.
The financial difficulties
Diagram 1
Breakdown of losses in 2002
(EUR million)
2.2.2.
The response from IFB and SNCB management
2.3.
The rescue and restructuring measures in the ‘framework agreement on the restructuring of IFB’ of 7 April 2003
2.3.1.
Terms and conditions governing the rescue measures
2.3.2.
Terms and conditions governing the restructuring measures
2.3.2.1.
The divestiture of the subsidiaries operating the terminals in France
(a)
Net borrowing requirement
(b)
Acimar
(c)
NFTI-ou
(d)
IFB France
(e)
Dry Port Dunkerque
(f)
SSTD
2.3.2.2.
The restructuring plan for the continuation of activities in Belgium
(a)
Financial results of the restructuring
(b)
Measures taken toward restructuring
2.4.
Description of the reasons which led to the initiation of the procedure on 7 December 2005
3.
BELGIUM’S COMMENTS
3.1.
Belgium’s observations on the procedure
3.2.
Absence of ‘State aid’ within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty
3.2.1.
Absence of State resources
3.2.2.
Absence of liability on the part of the Belgian State
3.2.3.
Principle of a private investor in a market economy
3.2.3.1.
Divestiture of French shareholdings
Acimar — judicial administration followed by liquidation
NFTI-ou — Handover
IFB France (AGEP) — Cession a NFTI-ou
Dry Port Dunkerque (DPD) — Liquidation with partial sale
SSTD: Cession
3.2.3.2.
Restructuring and continuation of IFB’s activities in Belgium
(a)
Net cost to SNCB if IFB had gone bankrupt in 2003
Diagram 2
Recovery of assets
(EUR million)
(b)
Valuation of IFB in a business-as-usual scenario
Diagram 4
Value of ifb based on discounted cash flows — Assumptions and results
(EUR million)
Diagram 5
Value of the ifb business
(EUR million)
Diagram 6
Evaluation of the investment option, January 2003
(EUR million)
(c)
Comparison of the two scenarios and conclusion
3.2.4.
Absence of distortion of competition
3.3.
Compatibility of the rescue measures with the guidelines
3.3.1.
IFB is not a newly created business
3.3.2.
The rescue measures are compatible with the 1999 guidelines
3.3.3.
The restructuring measures are compatible with the 1999 guidelines
3.3.3.1.
Applicability of the 1999 guidelines
3.3.3.2.
Measures to limit the adverse effects on competition as much as possible
3.3.3.3.
Limitation of the increase in capital to the minimum
Diagram 16
Level of solvency — sample of comparable companies, 2004
(*)
3.3.3.4.
IFB’s own contribution
4.
ASSESSMENT
4.1.
Evaluation of the aid character of the rescue and restructuring measures
4.1.1.
Aid granted by the State or through State resources
4.1.1.1.
State resources
4.1.1.2.
Imputability
(a)
Approval by public authorities (point 56 of the
Stardust Marine
ruling)
(b)
Press articles
(c)
Scope, contents, conditions of the framework agreement
(d)
Conclusion
4.1.2.
Advantage to the aid recipient applying the principle of an informed investor in a market economy
4.1.2.1.
Cost of restructuring IFB
4.1.2.2.
Hypothetical cost of the liquidation of IFB
4.1.2.3.
Conclusion
4.1.3.
Distortion of competition and effect on transactions between Member States
4.1.4.
Conclusion: existence of State aid
4.2.
Compatibility of the aid
4.2.1.
Compatibility as rescue aid
4.2.2.
Compatibility of restructuring aid
4.2.2.1.
Restructuring plan restoring the economic viability of the firm
4.2.2.2.
Prevention of undue distortions in competition
(a)
The Belgian freight transhipment market
(b)
The Belgian logistics market
(c)
Conclusion
4.2.2.3.
Aid limited to a minimum
(a)
Limitation of aid to a minimum
(i)
Solvency rate not exceeding the average of competitors
(ii)
Divestiture of shareholdings in France at lowest cost
(a)
Acimar
(b)
NFTI-ou
(c)
IFB France
(d)
Dry Port Dunkerque
(e)
SSTD
(f)
Conclusion
(b)
Beneficiaries’ own contribution
(i)
Costs of restructuring
(ii)
Financing by SNCB and own shareholding in IFB
4.2.2.4.
Annual report and ‘one time, last time’
5.
CONCLUSIONS
Article 1
Article 2