INHALT

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/39 of 16 January 2020 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of peroxosulphates (persulphates) originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/39
of 16 January 2020
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of peroxosulphates (persulphates) originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council
1.
PROCEDURE
1.1.
Measures in force
1.2.
Initiation of an expiry review
1.3.
Investigation
1.3.1.
Review investigation period and period considered
1.3.2.
Interested parties
1.3.3.
Sampling
1.3.4.
Questionnaires and verification visits
1.3.5.
Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation
2.
PRODUCT UNDER REVIEW AND LIKE PRODUCT
2.1.
Product under review
2.2.
Like product
3.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING
3.1.
Continuation of dumping of imports during the review investigation period
3.1.1.
Normal value
3.1.2.
Existence of significant distortions
3.1.2.1. Introduction
3.1.2.2. Significant distortions affecting the domestic prices and costs in the PRC: general economic context
3.1.2.3. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation: the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country
3.1.2.4. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation: State presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs
3.1.2.5. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation: public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces
3.1.2.6. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation: the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws
3.1.2.7. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation: wage costs being distorted
3.1.2.8. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation: access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting independently of the State
3.1.2.9. Systemic nature of the distortions described
3.1.2.10. Conclusion
3.1.3.
Representative country
3.1.4.
Calculation methodology
3.1.4.1. Data used for the construction of normal value
3.1.4.2. Raw Materials
3.1.4.3. Labour
3.1.4.4. Electricity
3.1.4.5. Steam and other direct costs
3.1.4.6. Manufacturing overhead costs
3.1.4.7. SG&A and profits
3.2.
Export price and dumping margin
3.3.
Likelihood of recurrence of dumping
3.3.1.
Comparison between the normal value and export price to the rest of the world
3.3.2.
Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC
3.4.
Conclusion on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping
4.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF INJURY
4.1.
Union production and Union industry
4.2.
Preliminary remark
4.3.
Consumption in the Union
4.4.
Imports into the Union from the PRC
4.4.1.
Volume and market share
4.5.
Imports from other third countries
4.6.
Economic situation of the Union industry
4.6.1.
Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
4.6.2.
Sales volume and market share in the Union
4.6.3.
Employment and productivity
4.6.4.
Growth
4.6.5.
Stocks
4.6.6.
Average unit sales prices in the Union and cost of production
4.6.7.
Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investment, ability to raise capital and wages
4.6.8.
Magnitude of dumping and recovery from past dumping
4.7.
Conclusion
5.
LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY
5.1.
Production capacity and spare capacities in the PRC
5.2.
The attractiveness of the Union market
5.3.
Price behaviour of Chinese exporting producers
5.4.
Effect on the Union industry situation
5.5.
Conclusion
6.
INTEREST OF THE UNION INDUSTRY
7.
INTEREST OF USERS
8.
INTEREST OF IMPORTERS
9.
CONCLUSION
10.
SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE
11.
ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
Article 1
Article 2