Commission Decision (EU) 2017/2336 of 7 February 2017 SA.21877 (C 24/2007), SA.27... (32017D2336)
INHALT
Commission Decision (EU) 2017/2336 of 7 February 2017 SA.21877 (C 24/2007), SA.27585 (2012/C) and SA.31149 (2012/C) — Germany Alleged State aid to Flughafen Lübeck GmbH, Infratil Limited, Ryanair and other airlines using the airport (notified under document C(2017) 602) (Text with EEA relevance. )
- COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2017/2336
- of 7 February 2017
- SA.21877 (C 24/2007), SA.27585 (2012/C) and SA.31149 (2012/C) — Germany Alleged State aid to Flughafen Lübeck GmbH, Infratil Limited, Ryanair and other airlines using the airport
- (notified under document C(2017) 602)
- (Only the German text is authentic)
- (Text with EEA relevance)
- 1.
- PROCEDURE
- 1.1.
- PROCEDURE SA.21877
- 1.2.
- PROCEDURES SA.27585 AND SA.31149
- 1.3.
- JOINT PROCEDURE CONCERNING SA.21877, SA.27585 AND SA.31149
- 1.4.
- APPEAL OF THE 2012 OPENING DECISION IN RELATION TO THE SCHEDULE OF AIRPORT CHARGES
- 2.
- DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES
- 2.1.
- BACKGROUND OF THE INVESTIGATION AND CONTEXT OF THE MEASURES
- 2.1.1.
- Catchment area, passenger development and airlines serving the airport
- Figure 1
- Origin of the outbound passengers at Lübeck airport (Market Study, 2009)
- 2.1.2.
- Ownership of the airport
- 2.2.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF FLG
- 2.3.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF INFRATIL
- 2.3.1.
- Sale of shares in FLG
- 2.3.2.
- The 2009 Additional Agreement and the renegotiation of the put option — Takeover of further losses, investments and other costs
- 2.4.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF RYANAIR
- 2.4.1.
- 2000 Agreement
- 2.4.2.
- 2010 Agreements
- 2.5.
- CHARGES FOR THE DE-ICING OF AIRCRAFTS AT THE AIRPORT
- 3.
- GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
- 3.1.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF FLG
- 3.2.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF INFRATIL
- 3.3.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF RYANAIR
- 3.4.
- CHARGES FOR THE DE-ICING OF AIRCRAFTS AT THE AIRPORT
- 4.
- COMMENTS FROM GERMANY
- 4.1.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF FLG
- 4.2.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF INFRATIL
- 4.2.1.
- Sale of shares in FLG
- 4.2.2.
- The 2009 Additional Agreement and the renegotiation of the put option — Takeover of further losses, investments and other costs
- 4.3.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF RYANAIR
- 4.3.1.
- 2000 Agreement
- 4.3.2.
- 2010 Agreements
- 4.4.
- CHARGES FOR THE DE-ICING OF AIRCRAFTS AT THE AIRPORT
- 5.
- OBSERVATIONS FROM THIRD PARTIES
- 5.1.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF FLG
- 5.2.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF INFRATIL
- 5.2.1.
- Sale of shares in FLG
- 5.2.1.1.
- Infratil
- 5.2.1.2.
- Ryanair
- 5.2.1.3.
- Schutzgemeinschaft
- 5.2.2.
- The 2009 Additional Agreement and the renegotiation of the put option — Takeover of further losses, investments and other costs
- 5.2.2.1.
- Infratil
- 5.2.2.2.
- Hansestadt Lübeck
- 5.2.2.3.
- Schutzgemeinschaft
- 5.2.2.4.
- Ryanair
- 5.3.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF RYANAIR
- 5.3.1.
- 2000 Agreement
- 5.3.1.1.
- Ryanair
- 5.3.1.2.
- Air Berlin
- 5.3.1.3.
- Infratil
- 5.3.1.4.
- Bundesverband der Deutschen Fluggesellschaften
- 5.3.2.
- 2010 Agreements
- 5.3.2.1.
- Flughafen Lübeck GmbH
- 5.3.2.2.
- Ryanair
- 5.3.2.3.
- Air Berlin
- 5.4.
- CHARGES FOR THE DE-ICING OF AIRCRAFTS AT THE AIRPORT
- 6.
- COMMENTS OF GERMANY ON THIRD PARTIES
- 6.1.
- COMMENTS ON RYANAIR'S SUBMISSIONS
- 6.2.
- COMMENTS ON SGF'S SUBMISSIONS
- 6.3.
- COMMENTS ON AIR BERLIN'S SUBMISSIONS
- 6.4.
- COMMENTS ON BDF'S SUBMISSIONS
- 7.
- ASSESSMENT
- 7.1.
- INTRODUCTION
- 7.2.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF FLG
- 7.2.1.
- Beneficiary of the potential State aid
- 7.2.2.
- Economic continuity between FLG and Yasmina
- 7.2.2.1.
- Scope of the sold assets
- 7.2.2.2.
- Sale price
- 7.2.2.3.
- Identity of the buyer
- 7.2.2.4.
- The moment of the sale
- 7.2.2.5.
- Economic logic of the operation
- 7.2.2.6.
- Conclusion on economic continuity between FLG and Yasmina
- 7.2.3.
- Economic continuity between FLG and PuRen
- 7.2.4.
- Advantage to the sold economic activity
- 7.2.5.
- Conclusion
- 7.3.
- POSSIBLE STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF INFRATIL
- 7.3.1.
- Sale of shares in FLG
- 7.3.1.1.
- Advantage
- Figure 2
- Low case NPV (90 % equity value) & purchase price
- 7.3.1.2.
- Conclusion on the overall profitability of the deal
- 7.3.2.
- The 2009 Additional Agreement and the renegotiation of the put option — Takeover of losses, investments and other costs of FLG in 2009
- 7.3.2.1.
- Advantage
- 7.3.2.2.
- Conclusion
- 7.4.
- POTENTIAL STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF RYANAIR
- 7.4.1.
- Economic advantage
- 7.4.2.
- Application of the MEO principle to the 2000 Agreement
- 7.4.2.1.
- Preliminary remarks
- 7.4.2.2.
- Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
- 7.4.3.
- Conclusion
- 7.5.
- CHARGES FOR THE DE-ICING OF AIRCRAFTS
- 7.5.1.
- Selectivity
- 7.5.2.
- Conclusion
- 8.
- CONCLUSION
- Article 1
- Article 2
- Article 3
- Article 4
- Article 5
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